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Double-Edged Protect ion 
In  c o n t e m p o r a r y  A m e r i c a n  par  l a n c e ,  t h e  word " p r o t e c t i o n "  s o u n d s  t w o  
contrasting tones. One is comforting,  t h e  o ther  ominous. With one tone, "protection" 
ca l l s  up images of t h e  shelter  against  danger provided b y . a  powerful  friend, a large 
insurance policy, o r .  a sturdy roof. With t h e  .o ther ,  i t  evokes t h e  racket  in which a 
l o c a l  s t r o n g m a n  f o r c e s  merchants  to pay t r ibu te  in order t o  avoid damage, damage 
t h e  strongman himself th rea tens  to deliver. The  di f ference,  t o  b e  sure,  is a m a t t e r  
of degree:  a hell-and-damnation priest  is only likely t o  col lect  contributions from his 
parishioners t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  they believe his predictions of brimstone fo r  infidels; 
t h e  n e i g h b o i h o o d l  m o b s t e r  may  a c t u a l l y  ' b e ,  as h e  c l a i m s  t o  be,  a brothel's bes t  
guaran tee  of operation f r e e  of police interference.  
Which i m a g e  t h e  word " p r ~ t e c t i o n ' ~  b r i n g s  to mind d e p e n d s  mainly on our 
assessment  of t h e  reali ty and  external i ty  of t h e  t h r e a t .  Someone who produces both 
t h e  d a n g e r  a n d ,  a t  a p r i c e ,  t h e  s h i e l d  a g a i n s t  it is a racke tee r .  Someone who 
provides a needed shield but has l i t t le  c o n t r o l ' o v e r  the .  danger's appearance qualifies 
as a legi t imate  protector  -- especially if his price is no higher than his competitors' .  
Someone who supplies reliable, low-priced shielding b o t h  f r o m  l o c a l  r a c k e t e e r s  a n d  
f rom outside marauders makes t h e  bes t  o f fe r  of all.  
Apologists fo r  part icular governments and f o r  government in general  commonly 
a r g u e ,  p r e c i s e l y  , tha t  they offer  protection f rom local  and ex te rna l  violence. They 
c la im t h a t  t h e  prices they charge barely cover  t h e  cos t s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n .  They  c a l l  
people who complain about  t h e  price of protect ion "anarchists",  subversive^^^, or both 
at once. But consider t h e  defin,ition of a racke tee r  as ,someone who c r e a t e s  a th rea t ,  
t h e n .  c h a r g e s  f o r  its r e d u c t i o n .  G o v e r n m e n t s '  p rov i s ion  of p r o t e c t i o n ,  . b y  t h i s  ' . 
standard,  o f t e n  qualifies as racketeering. T o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  t h r e a t s  a g a i n s t  
which a given government protects  i t s  c i t izens  a r e  imaginary, or  a r e  consequences of 
i t s  o w n  a c t i v i t i e s ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  o r g a n i z e d  a p r o t e c t i o n  r a c k e t .  S i n c e  
governments themselves commonly s t imulate  or  even manufacture th rea t s  of .external  
w a r ,  and  s i n c e  t h e  r e p r e s s i v e  a n d  e x t r a c t i v e  ac t iv i t ' i e s  of g o v e r n m e n t s  o f t e n  
c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  largest  cur ren t  t h r e a t s  t o  t h e  livelihoods of thei r  own cit izens,  many 
governments o p e r a t e  in essentially t h e  s a m e  ways as racketeers.  There  is, of course, 
a 'difference:  racketeers ,  by t h e  conventional definition, operate  without t h e  authority 
of governments. ' 
How do racketeer-gov'ernments themselves acquire  authority? As a question of 
f a c t  and of-  ethics,  t h a t  is one of t h e  oldest  conundrums of political analysis. Back 
t o  M a c h i a v e l l i  a n d  Hobbes, nevertheless,  politi a1 observers have recognized t h a t  -- 
whatever  else' they d o  -- g o v e r n m e n t s  o r g a n i z e  a n d ,  w h e r e  poss ib le ,  monopol ize  ' 
' v io lence .  I t  m a t t e r s  l i t t l e  w h e t h e r  w e  t a k e  v io lence  in a narrow sense such as 
d a m a g e - t o  persons and objects  o r  in  a b r o a d  s e n s e  s u c h  a s  v io la t ion '  o f  peop le ' s  
' d e s i r e s  a n d  i n t e r e s t s ;  by e i t h e r  c r i t e r i o n  g o v e r n m e n t s  s t a n d  o u t .  f r o m  o t h e r  
organizations by thei r  tendency t o  monopolize t h e  c o n c e n t r a t e d  m e a n s  of v i o l e n c e .  
T h e  ' d i s t i n c t i o n  . between.  "legitimate" and "illegitimate" force ,  fur thermore,  makes no 
d i f fe rence  t o  t h e  fact. Indeed, Arthur Stinchcornbe's agreeably cynical t r e a t m e n t  of 
' ' legit imacy as t h e  probability t h a t  o the r  author i t ies ,  will act t o  confirm t h e  decisions 
of a given authority underscores t h e  importance of t h e  authority's monopoly of force.  
A t e n d e n c y  t o  monopol ize  t h e  m e a n s  of v i o l e n c e  makes a government's claim t o  
provide protection,  in e i the r  t h e  comforting or  t h e  ominous sense of t h e  word, more  
credible  and harder t o  resist.  
F r a n k  recogni t ' ion  of f o r c e ' s  c e n t r a l  place in governmental  ac t iv i ty  does not  
require us t o  believe t h a t  governmental  author i ty  res ts  "only1' o r  "ultimately" on t h e  
t h r e a t  of v i o l e n c e .  Nor d o e s  i t  e n t a i l  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  a government's only 
service  is protection.  Even where t h e  government ' s  u s e  o f  f o r c e  i m p o s e s  a l a r g e  
cos t ,  some people may well decide t h a t  a government's o ther  services outbalance t h e  
. cos t s  of acceding t o  i t s  monopoly of violence. Recognition of t h e  centra l i ty  of f o r c e  
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opens the  way t o  a n  understanding of t h e  growth and change of governmental  forms. 
This essay concerns t h e  place of organized means  of v i o l e n c e  in t h e  g r o w t h  
and change 'o f  those ~ e c u l i a r  forms of government  we cal l  national states: relatively 
' centra l ized,  d i f ferent ia ted o rgan iza t ions  whose  o f f i c i a l s  m o r e  o r  l e s s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  
I 
c l a i m  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  chie.f c o n c e n t r a t e d .  .means  of violence within a population 
inhabiting a large, contiguous terri tory.  The argument  grows f rom historical  work on 
t h e  f o r m a t i o n  , of national states in western Europe, especially on t h e  growth of t h e  
F r e n c h  state f r o m  1600 onward. But it t akes  several  del ibera te  steps away f rom t h a t  
work ,  w h e e l s ,  a n d  s t a r e s  hard at . i t  f rom theore t i ca l  ground. The argument  brings 
with i t  f e w  illustrations, and no evidence worthy of t h e  name. 
As o n e  r e p a c k s  a .has t i ly - f i l l ed  r u c k s a c k  a f t e r  a f e w  : d a y s  on t h e  t ra i l  - 
throwing ou t  t h e  waste,  putt ing things in order of importance,  and balancing t h e  load 
-- I h a v e  r e p a c k e d  my theoret ica l  baggage fo r  t h e  c l imb t o  come;  t h e  r e a l  test of 
t h e  new packing. only arr ives  with t h e  next  s t r e t c h  of t h e  trail.  The trimmed-down 
a r g u m e n t  s t r e s s e s  a )  t h e  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  o f  w a r m a k i n g  a n d  statemaking,  b) . the  
' analogy between both of those -  processes and what,  when less successful and smaller  
in scale,  w e  cal l  organized crime. War makes states, I will claim. Banditry, piracy, 
gangland rivalry, policing, and warmaking a l l  belong on t h e  s a m e  continuum -- t h a t  I 
will claim as well. For t h e  historically-limited period in which national states were  
becoming t h e  dominant organizations in western countries,  I will a l s o  c l a i m  t h a t  c )  
mercant i le  capital ism and s ta temaking reinforced e a c h  other.  
Here  is  a preview of t h e  most .genera l  argument:  Powerholders' pursuit of war 
invo lved  t h e m  wi'lly-nilly ' i n  t h e  e x t r a c t i o n  of resources  for warmaking f rom the  
populat idns  over which they 'had control, and in t h e  promotion of capi ta l  accumulation 
by t h o s e  who cou ld  help.  them borrow and buy. Warmaking, extract ion,  and capi ta l  
accumulat ion i n t e r a c t e d  t o  s h a p e  E u r o p e a n  s t a t e m a k i n g .  ~ o w e r h o l d ~ r s  d i d  n o t  
b ' u n b e r t a k e  t h o s e  t h r e e  m o m e n t o u s  act iv i t ies  with t h e  intention of creat ing national 
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states: centra l ized,  d i f ferent ia ted,  a u ~ o n o m o u ~ ,  extensive political organizations. Nor 
did they o rd inar i ly  f o r e s e e  t h a t  n a t i o n a l  states would e m e r g e  f r o m  warmaking ' ,  
e x t r a c t i o n ,  a n d  c a p i t a  1 acc.umulation. Instead, t h e  people who controlled European 
states a n d  s . t a tes - in - the -making  .war red  i n  o r d e r  t o  c h e c k  o r  o v e r c o m e  t h e i r  
competi tors,  .and thus t o  enjoy t h e  advantages.. of pow&- within a secure  o r  expanding 
terr i tory .  ' To make more  e f fec t ive  war, they a t t e m p t e d  t o  loca te  more  capital. In 
t h e  shor t  run, they might acquire  t h a t  cap i ta l  by conquest ,  by selling off thei r  assets, 
by coercing or  .dispossessing a c c u m u l a t o r s  of c a p i t a l .  In t h e  l o n g  r u n ,  t h e  q u e s t  
inevitably involved them in. establishing regular access t o  capi ta l is ts  who could supply. 
and  arrange credi t ,  and in imposing one fo rm of regular taxat ion or  a n o t h e r  o n  t h e  
people and act iv i t ies  within thei r  spheres of control. As t h e  process continued, they 
developed a durable in teres t  in promoting t h e  accumulation of capi ta l ,  s o m e t i m e s  in 
t h e  g u i s e  o f  d i r e c t  r e tu rn  t o  ' their  o w i ~  enterprises.  , Variations in t h e  difficulty of 
these  act iv i t ies  - how hard it was  t o  col lect  taxes,  how expensive was t h e  part icular 
k ind o f  a r m e d  fo rce  adopted,  how much warmaking it took t o  hold o f f .  competi tors,  
and so on - caused t h e  principal. variants in t h e  fo rms  of European  states. I t  a l l  
b e g a n  w i t h  t h e  e f f o r t  t o  monopol ize  t h e  m e a n s  of v i o l e n c e  w i t h i n  a delimited 
ter r i tory  adjacent  t o  .a powerholder's base. 
Violence and Government . . 
What distinguished t h e  violence produced .by  states from the  violence delivered 
by anyone else? In t h e  long run, enough t o  make  t h e  division between "legitimate" 
a n d  " i l l e g i t i m a t e "  f o r c e .  c r e d i b l e .  E v e n t u a l l y ,  t h e  p e r s o n n e l  o f  states purveyed 
violence on  a larger scale ,  more effectively,  more  efficiently,  with wider assent  f r o m  
t h e i r  s u b j e c t  populations, and with readier collaboration f rom neighboring author i t ies  
than did t h e  personnel of o ther  organizations. But t h a t  ser ies  of dist inctions.  took a 
long t i m e  t o  e s t a b l i s h .  Early in the  s ta temaking process, many par t i e s . shared  t h e  
right t o  use violence, t h e  p rac t i ce  of using i t  routinely t o  accomplish their  ends, o r  
b o t h  at. o n c e .  T h e  c o n t i n u u m  r a n .  f r o m  b a n d i t s  a n d  p i r a t e i  t o  k i n g s  v ia  t a x  
collectors,  regional powerholders, and professional soldiers. 
T h e  u n c e r t a i n ,  e l a s t i c  l i n e  b e t w e e n  " l e g i t i m a t e "  and "illegitimate" violence 
.' ' appeared in t h e  upper reaches  of power. ~ a r l ~  in  t h e  s t a t e m a k i n g  p r o c e s s ,  m a n y  
par t ies  shared the' right t o  use violence, i t s  a c t u a l  employment,  o r  both at once. . The 
long love-hate a f fa i r  between aspiring s t a t e m a k e r s  and  pi ra tes  or  b a n d i t s  i l l u s t r a t e s  
t h e  division. "Behind, piracy on t h e  - seas a c t e d  c i t i e s  .and city-states," wri tes  Fernand 
Braudel of t h e  sixteenth century.  "Behind banditry, t h a t  t e r res t r i a l  piracy, appeared 
t h e  continual a id  of lords . . . (Braudel 1966, 11: 88-89). . In t imes  o f  war,  indeed, 
the,  managers '  of full-fledged states of ten  commissioned . p r i v a t e e r s ,  h i r e d  s o m e t i m e  
bandits  t o  raid their  enemies,  and encouraged the i r  regular troops t o  t ake .  booty. In 
royal service,  soldiers and sailors w e r e  o f t e n  expected t o  provide fo r  t h e m s e l v e s  by 
p r e y i n g  on t h e  c i v i l i a n  popula t ion :  c o m m a n d e e r i n g ,  raping, looting, . taking prizes. 
When demobilized, they commonly continued t h e  s a m e  pract ices ,  but without t h e  s a m e  
royal protection; demobilized ships became pira te  vessels, demobilized troops bandits. 
It .also worked t h e  other  way: a king's bes t  source of armed supporters was somet imes 
1 
t h e  world of outlaws. Robin Hood's conversion t o  royal a rcher  may be  a myth, but 
t h e  m i t h  records a practice.  The distinctions between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" 
u s e r s  o f  v i o l e n c e  only c a m e  clear  very slowly, in t h e  process of making t h e  state's 
a rmed  forces  relatively unified and permanent.  
U p  t o  t h a t  p o i n t ,  as B r a u d e l  s a y s ,  m a r i t i m e  c i t i e s  a n d  t e r r e s t r i a l  l o r d s  
commonly offered protection,  or  even sponsorship, t o  f r e e b o o t e r s .  Many l o r d s  who  
did no t  ,pre tend t o  be kings, fur thermore,  successfully claimed t h e  right t o  levy troops 
and maintain thei r  own armed retainers. Without calling on sdrne of those  lords t o  
b r i n g  t h e i r  a r m i e s  w i t h  t h e m ,  no king could f ight  . a  war. Yet those s a m e  armed 
lords consti tuted the  king's rivals and opponents, his  enemies '  p o t e n t i a l  a l l i e s .  For  
t h a t  r e a s o n ,  b e f o r e  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  century,  regencies for child-sovereigns reliably 
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p r o d u c e d  c i v i l  wars .  For  t h e  s a m e  reason, disarming t h e  g r e a t  stood .high on t h e  
agenda of every would-be s ta temaker .  
. , T h e  T u d o r s ,  .for . e x a m p l e ,  . accomplished t h a t  agenda through most of England. 
.' "The greates t .  t r iumph of t h e  Tudors,'' wr i tes  Lawrence Stone, 
w a s  t h e  u l t i m a t e l y  successful  a s s e r t i o ~  of a royal monopoly of violence both 
public and pr ivate ,  a n  a c l l i e v e m e n t  which  p rofoundly  a l t e r e d  n o t  only  t h e  ' 
na ture  of politics but  also the  quality of daily life. There  occurred a c h a ~ g e  
in English habits  t h a t  can  only be compared with t h e  fu r the r  s t e p  taken in t h e  
nineteenth century,  when t h e  growth of a police to rce  finally consolidated t h e  
monopoly and made it e f fec t ive  in t h e  g r e a t e s t  c i t i e s  and t h e  smallest  villages 
(Stone 1965: 200). 
The Tudor d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o ~  of t h e  g rea t  lords enta i led  four complementary  campaigns: 
el iminating thei r  g r e a t  personal- bands of a r m e d  r e t a i n e r s ,  r a z i n g  t h e i r  f o r t r e s s e s ,  
t a m i n g  th ' e i r  . h a b i t u a l  r e s o r t  t o  v i o l e n c e  f o r  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  of d i s p u t e s ,  a n d  
discouraging t h e  cooperation of thei r  d e p e n d e n t s  a n d  t e n a n t s .  In t h e  M a r c h e s  of 
England  a n d  S c o t l a n d ,  t h e  t a sk  was more del icate ,  fo r  t h e  Percys  and Dacres who . 
kep t  armies  and cas t l es  along t h e  border th rea tened  t h e  crown, but a l s o  p rov ided  a 
buffer  against  Scott ish invaders. But they, too,  eventually fell.  into line. , 
In F r a n c e ,  R i c h e l i e u  b e g a n  t h e  g r e a t  d i s a r m a m e n t  in t h e  1 6 2 0 s .  W i t h  
Richelieu's advice, Louis XI11 systematically ordered t h e  destruction of t h e  cas t les  of 
t h e  g r e a t  rebel  lords,  P r o t e s t a n t  and  c a t h o l i c ,  a g a i n s t  w h o m  h i s  f o r c e s  b a t t l e d  
incessantly. He b e g a n  t o  condemn duelling, t h e  carrying ,of l e tha l  weapons, and t h e  
maintenance of private armies. By t h e  l a te r  1620s, Richelieu was  declaring t h e  royal 
monopoly of f o r c e  as doc t r ine .  The doctr.ine took another  half-century t o  beco'me 
effect ive:  . 
Once more t h e  conflicts  of the  Fronde had wi,&essed a rmies  assembled by t h e  
'grands'. Only t h e  las t  of t h e  regencies, t h e  one a f t e r  t h e  dea th  of Louis XIV, 
did no t  lead t o  a rmed  uprisings. By . tha t  t i m e  Richelieu's principle had become 
a reali ty.  L i k e w i s e  in t h e  E m p i r e  a f t e r  t h e  T h i r t y  Y e a r s '  War o n l y  t h e  
ter r i tor ia l  princes had t h e  right of levying troops and of maintaining for t resses  
.. . . Everywhere t h e  razing of castles,  t h e  high -cost  of art i l lery,  t h e  a t t r ac t ion  
of c o u r t  l i f e ,  a n d  t h e  ensuing domestication of the  nobility had .its share in 
th is  development (Cerhard 1981: 124-1251. 
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By t h e  l a t e r  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  t h r o u g h  m o s t  of E u r o p e  m o n a r c h s  disposed of 
p e r m a n ~ n t , ~ p r o f & s s i o n a l  military fo rces  which rivaled those  of the i r  neighbors and f a r  
e x c e e d e d  a n y  o t h e r  organized a rmed  force  within the i r  own . terri tories.  The s ta te ' s  
monopoly of 'large-scale violence'. was turning f r o m  theory t o  reality. i 
The elimination -of . local  rivals, however, posed a serious problem. Beyond the  
sca le  of a small  ci ty-state,  no monarch could g o v e r n  a p o p u l a t i o n  w i t h  his  a r m e d  
f o r c e  a l o n e ,  a n d  no m o n a r c h  cou ld  afford t o  c r e a t e  a. professional s taf f  large and 
s t rong enough t o  reach f rom him t o  t h e -  ordinary cit izen.  B e f o r e q u i t e  recently, no 
European government approached t h e  completeness of ar t icula t ion f r o m  top  t o  bottom 
achieved by imperial  China. Even t h e  Roman Empire  did n o t  c o m e  c lose .  In o n e  
w a y  o r  a n b t h e r ,  e v e r y  European government be fore  t h e  French Revolutidn relied on - 
indirect '  rule via local  magnates. The magnates  c o l l a b o r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
without becoming officials  in any strong sense of t h e  t e r m ,  disposed t o  some ex ten t  
o f  g o v e r n m e n t - b a c k e d  f o r c e ,  a n d  e x e r c i s e d  w i d e  d i s c r e t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e i r  o w n  
t e r r i t o r i e s :  J u n k e r s ,  J u s t i c e s  o f  t h e  Peace,  lords. Yet those s a m e  magnates were  
potent ia l  rivals, possible al l ies of a rebellious people. 
E v e n t u a l l y ,  E u r o p e a n  g o v e r n m e n t s  reduced thei r  rel iance on indirect rule by 
means  of two expensive but  e f f e c t i v e  strategies: 1) extending thei r  officialdom down 
, t o  t h e  l o c a l  community ,  a n d ,  2 )  encouraging t h e  c rea t ion  of police forces  t h a t  were  
subordinate  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  p a t r o n s ,  d i s t i n c t  f r o m  
warmaking forces ,  and therefore  less useful as t h e  tools of dissident magnates. But 
in between t h e  builders of national power a l l  played a mixed s t r a t e g y :  e l i m i n a t i n g ,  
s u b  jug a t  i n g  , d i v i d i n g ,  c o n q u e r i n g ,  c a j o l i n g ,  b u y i n g  as t h e  o c c a s i o n s  p r e s e n t e d  
themselves. The buying. manifested,  itself in exemptions  f rom taxat ion,  c r e a t i o n s  o f  
honorific offices,  t h e  establishment of claims o n -  t h e  national treasury,  and a variety 
of o ther  devices t h a t  made a magnate's welfare depend on t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  of t h e  . . 
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e x i s t i n g  s t r , u c t u r e  o f  p o w e r .  In t h e  long  r u n ,  i t  a l l  c a m e  down t o  m a s s i v e  
pacification,  and monopolization of t h e  means  of coercion.  
Protect ion as Business 
In re  tcospect ,  t h e  pacification, cooptation,  o r  el imination of fractious rivals t o  
. . 
t h e  sovereign seems an  awesome,. 'noble, prescient  enterpr ise ,  destined t o  bring peace  
t o  a people. ' Yet i t  followed a lmost  ineluctably.  f rom t h e  logic of expanding power. 
, If a powkrholder' was t o  gain f rom t h e  provision of protect ion,  those compet i tors  had 
t o  y i e l d .  As e c o n o m i c  h i s t o r i a n  F r e d e r i c  L a n e  p u t  i t  t w e n t y - f i v e  y e a r s  a g o ,  
governments a r e  in t h e  business of selling protect ion ; . . whether people want it o r  
not. Lane argued t h a t  t h e  very act iv i ty  of producing and  controlling violence favored 
monopoly, s ince  competi t ion w i t h i n  t h a t  r e a l m  g e n e r a l l y  r a i s e d  c o s t s ,  i n s t e a d  o f  
lowering them.  The production of violence, he  suggested,  enjoyed large economies of 
scale.  -Working f rom there ,  h e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  b e t w e e n  a )  t h e  monopoly p r o f i t ,  o r  
t r ibute ,  coming t o  owners of t h e  means of production of violence as a result  of t h e  
di f ference between production costs  and t h e  pr ice  exac ted  f rom "customers",  a n d  b) 
t h e  p r o t e c t i o n '  r e n t  a c c r u i n g  t o  those cus tomers  -- for example,  merchants -- who 
drew e f f e c t i v e  'protect ion against  outside c o m p e t i t o r s .  L a n e ,  a s u p e r b l y ,  a t t e n t i v e  
historian of Venice, allowed specifically for  t h e  case of a government t h a t  generates  
protect ion ren t s  f o r  i t s  merchants  by deliberately a t t a c k i n g  t h e i r  c o m p e t i t o r s .  In 
thei r  adapta t ion of Lane's scheme, fur thermore,  Ames and Rapp (1 977) substi tute t h e  
. . 
a p t  word "extortiont'  fo r  Lane's "tribute". In th is  model, predation, coercion, piracy, 
b a n d i t r y ,  a n d  r a c k e t e e r i n g  s h a r e  . a  h o m e  w i t h  the i r  upright cousins in responsible 
government. 
H e r e  i s  how L a n e ' s  m o d e l  worked: 1f a pi ince  could c r e a t e  sufficient a rmed  
' fo rce  t o  hold off  his and his subjects'  ex te rna l  enemies  and t o  keep t h e  subjects in 
' 
- line for  50 megapbunds, but was ab le  t o  e x t r a c t  75 megapounds in taxes  f r o m ' t h o s e  
subjects  for t h a t  purpose, he  gained a t r ibute  of (75 - 50 = ) 25 megapounds; But if 
t h e  10-pound share of those t axes  paid by one of t h e  prince's merchant-subjects gave 
h i m  ,assured access t o  world m a r k e t s  at less t h a n  t h e  15-pound shares  p a i d  t o  t h e i r  
! 
princes by ' t h e  merchant 's  foreign competi tors,  t h e  merchant also gained a protection 
' 
ren t  of (15 : 10 = ) 5 pounds by vi r tue  o f  h i s  p r i n c e ' s  g r e a t e r  e f f i c i e n c y .  T h a t  
reasoning differs only in degree  and in scale . . f rom the  reasoning of violence-wielding 
criminals and thei r  clients. ' Labor racketeer ing (in which, fo r  example,  a ship-owner 
holds off  t rouble  f r o m  longshoremen by means of a t imely payment t o  t h e  local union 
boss) works on exact ly  t h e  s a m e  principle: t h e  union boss  g e t s  t r i b u t e  f o r  h i s  no- 
s t r i k e  p r e s s u r e  on t h e  l o n g s h o r e m e n ,  w h i l e  t h e  sh ipowner  avoids t h e  str ikes and 
slowdowns longshoremen impose on his competi tors.  
Lane pointed ou t  what d i f ferent  behavior we might expec t  of t h e  managers of 
a protection-providing government owned by: 
1. c i t izens  in general; 
2. a single self-interested, monarch; 
3. t h e  managers themselves. 
If c i t i z e n s  in ' g e n e r a l  exercised e f fec t ive  ownership of t h e  government -- o dis tant  
ideal! - we might expec t  the, managers t o  minimize protection costs  and tr ibute,  thus  
m a x i m i z i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  r e n t .  A si-ngle s e l f  - interested monarch, in contras t ,  would 
maximize tr ibute,  set costs s a  as t o  ziccomplish t h a t  maximization of t r ibute ,  and act 
indifferent to  t h e  level of ' protection rent. If t h e  managers owned the  government,  
they would tend t o  keep costs  high by m a x i m i z i n g  t h e i r  own w a g e s ,  t o  m a x i m i z e  
' . t r ibu te  over a n d  above those cos t s  by exact ing a high price f rom their  'subjects,  and , 
likewise act indifferent t o  t h e  level  of protection rent.,  The f i rs t  model approximates 
a J e f f e r ~ n i a n  democracy, .  t h e  second a pe t ty  d e ~ ~ o t i s ' m ,  t h e  third a military junta. 
Lane did not discuss t h e  obvious four th  ca tegory  of owner, a d o m i n a n t  c l a s s .  
: If he  had, his scheme would have yielded interesting .empirical c r i t e r i a  for evaluating 
c la ims t h a t  'a given government was "relatively autonomous'' or str ict ly subordinate t o  
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a d o m i n a n t  c l a s s ' s  i n t e r e s t s .  Presumably a subordinate government would tend t o  
maximize monopoly p r o f i t s  -- r e t u r n s '  t o  t h e  d o m i n a n t  c l a s s ' r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  t h e  . - 
' difference between t h e  cos t s  of protection and t h e  price received for i t  -- as well as 
' protection rents  tuned nicely to t h e  economic in te res t s  of t h e  d o m i n a n t  c l a s s .  An 
. . 
autonomous government,  in con t ras t ,  would teod t o  maximize manager's wages and.  i t s  
. . 
own s ize  as well, and would act i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  p r o t e c t i o n  r e n t s . .  Lane ' s  a n a l y s i s  
immediately suggests f resh propositions, and ways of tes t ing them. 
Lane also speculated t h a t  t h e  logic of t h e  si tuation produced f o u r  s u c c e s s i v e  
s t ages  within the  general  history of capitalism: 
1. a period of anarchy and plunder; 
- 2. a s t age  in which tr ibute-takers were  a t t r a c t i n g  customers  and establishing 
thei r '  monopolies by struggling t o  c r e a t e  exclusive, substantial  s ta tes ;  
3 .  a s t a g e  - in which  m e r c h a n t s  a n d  l a n d l o r d s  b e g a n  t o  g a i n  m o r e  f r o m  
protection ren t s  than governors did f rom t r ibute ;  
4. a p e r i o d  - - , f a i r l y  r e c e n t  -- in w h i c h ,  t e c h n o l o g i c a l .  c h a n g e s  surpassed- 
protection rents  as sources of profi t  fo r  entrepreneurs.  
Want ing  t o  c o n t a i n  h i s  a n a l y s i s  n e a t l y  within t h e  neoclassical theory of industrial 
organization, Lane cramped his t r e a t m e n t  of p r o t e c t i o n :  t r e a t i n g  a l l  t a x p a y e r s  as 
" c u s t o m e r s "  f o r  t h e  " se rv ice"  p rov ided  by protect ion-manufactur ing '  governments, 
' 
brushing aside t h e  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  i d e a  of a f o r c e d  s a l e  by i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  
" c u s t o m e r "  a l w a y s  h a d  t h e  c h o i c e  of n o t  pay ing .  a n d  taking t h e  consequences of 
nonpayment, minimizing t h e  p r o b l e m s  of d i v i s i b i l i t y  ' c r e a t e d  by t h e  pub,l ic-goods 
charac te r  o f .  protection,  and deliberately neglecting t h e  distinction between t h e  cos t s  
of producing . the  means  of violence in general  and t h e  c o s t s  o f  g iv ing  " c u s t o m e r s "  
protection by means o f  t h a t .  violence. Lane's ideas .s"ffocate .inside the  neoclassical 
. ' box, and breathe  easily outside it. Nevertheless, inside' or .  outside they draw 
t h e  e c o n o m i c  a n a l y s i s  .of government back t o  t h e  chief ac t iv i t ies  rea l  governments 
have carried on historically: war ,  repression, protection,  adjudication. 
More recently,  Richard Bean has applied a similar logic t o  t h e  rise of European 
national states between 1400 and  1600. He a p p e a l s  t o  e c o n o m i e s  of s c a l e  in t h e  
production of e f fec t ive  force ,  ,counteracted by diseconomies of sca le  in command and 
control. He  , t h e n  c la ims t h a t  t h e  improvement of ar t i l lery  in t h e  f i f t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  
( a s  c a n n o n  m a d e  s m a l l  Medieval fo r t s  much..more vulnerable t o  a n  organized force) 
shifted t h e  c v r v e  of economies  and d i seconomies  to m a k e  l a r g e r  a r m i e s ,  s t a n d i n g  
armies,  and centra l ized governments advantageous t o  thei r  masters.  Hence, according 
to Bean, mili tary innovation promoted t h e  creat ion of l a r g e ,  e x p e n s i v e ,  w e l l - a r m e d  
national s t a tes .  
History Talks 
Bean 's  s u m m a r y  d o e s  n o t  s t a n d  up t o  h i s t o r i c a l  scrutiny. '  As a m a t t e r  of 
pract ice ,  t h e  shi f t  t o  infantry-backed art i l lery sieges of for t i f ied  cities only occurred 
during t h e  s ix teenth  and seventeenth  centuries. That  was  t o o  l a te  t o  have caused t h e  . . 
increase .in t h e  viable size of states. Nor is it obvious t h a t  changes in land war .had 
t h e  sweeping influence Bean a t t r ibu tes  t o  them. The increasing decisiveness of naval 
w a r f a r e ,  which  o c c u r r e d  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,  c o u l d  w e l l  h a v e  s h i f t e d  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
a d v a n t a g e  t o  s m a l l  m a r i t i m e  p o w e r s .  such as t h e  Dutch Republic. Although many 
c i ty-s ta tes  and o ther  microscopic ent i t ies  disappeared in to  larger political units before 
1600, fur thermore,  such even t s  a s  the  fractionation .of  t h e  Habsburg empire  and such 
f a c t s  a s  t h e  persistence of large but loosely-knit Poland and  Russia render ambiguous 
t h e  c l a i m  o f  a s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  in g e o g r a p h i c a l  sca le .  In short ,  both Bean's 
proposed explanation and his s t a t e m e n t  of what m u s t  b e  e x p l a i n e d  r a i s e  h i s t o r i c a l  , 
doubts. 
Stripped of i t s  technological determinism,' nevertheless,  Bean's logic provides a 
useful complement  t o  Lane's. For va ry ing  m i l i t a r y  f o r m a t s  d o  c o s t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
different.  amounts  t o  produce, and do provide substantial ly di f ferent  ranges 'of control  . 
over opponents, domestic and foreign. After  1400 t h e  E u r o p e a n  p u r s u i t  of l a r g e r ,  
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more permanent,  and. more  costly variet ies of mili tary organization .did, in f a c t ,  drive 
spectacular  increases .in princely budgets, taxes,  and s taffs .  After  1500 or  so, princes 
w h o  m a n a g e d  t o  c r e a t e  t h e  c o s t l y  variet ies of mili tary organization were, indeed, 
ab le  t o  conquer new ,chunks of terri tory.  
  he' word "territory" should not  mislead, us. Until t h e  e ighteenth  century,  t h e  
g r e a t e s t  p o w e r s  - w e r e  m a r i t i m e  s t a t e s ,  a n d  n a v a l  w a r f a r e  r e m a i n e d  c r u c i a l  t o  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ' consider  Fernand Braudel's roll-call of s u c ~ e s s i v e  hegemonic 
.powers  within t h e  capi ta l is t  world: Venice  a n d  i t s  e m p i r e ,  G e n o a  a n d  its e m p i r e ,  
A n t w e r p I S p a i n ,  A m s t e r d a m / H o l l a n d ,  London/England, New Yorklthe United States.  
Although Brandenburg-Prussia o f fe r s  a part ial  exception,  only in o u r  own t i m e  h a v e  
such essential ly landbound s t a t e s  as Russia and China achieved preponderant positions 
in t h e  world's sys tem of states. Naval warfare  was by no means  t h e  only reason for  
t h a t  b i a s  t o w a r d  t h e  sea. Before t h e  la ter  n ineteenth  century,  land' transportation 
was . so  expensive everywhere in Europe t h a t  no country  could afford  t o  supply a large 
a r m y  o r  a big c i t y  with grain and other  heavy goods without having eff ic ient  water 
transport .  Rulers only fed major inland cen te r s  such as Berlin-and Madrid at g r e a t  . 
e f f o r t ,  a n d  at considerable  cost  t o  their  hinterlands. The exceptional efficiency of 
waterways in t h e  Netherlands undoubtedly gave t h e  Dutch g r e a t  advantages  at peace 
and at war (see de  Vries 1978). 
A c c e s s  t o  w a t e r  m a t t e r e d  in another important  way. Those metropolises in 
Braudel's list were  a l l  m a j o r  p o r t s ,  g r e a t  c e n t e r s  o f -  c o m m e r c e ,  a n d  o u t s t a n d i n g  
. ' m o b i l i z e r s  o f  c a p i t a l .  Both t h e  t r a d e  a n d  t h e  c a p i t a l  s e r v e d  t h e  p u r p o s e s  of 
ambitious rulers. By a c i r c u i t o u s  r o u t e ,  t h a t  o b s e r v a t i o n  b r i n g s  u s  b a c k  t o  ' t h e  
a r g u m e n t s  o f  L a n e  a n d  l ~ e a n .  Cons ider ing  t h a t  both of them wrote  ds economic 
historians, t h e  g rea tes t  weakness ,  in t h e  LaneIBean analysis comes  as a surprise: both . . 
of them understate t h e  importance of capi ta l  accumulation t o  military expansion. As 
Jan  d e  Vries says  of t h e  period a f t e r  1600: 
French Royal Revenues and E x p e n d i t u r e s ,  1515-1785, 
i n  Tons of F i n e  S i l v e r .  
Source :  Gu6.r~ 1978: 227.  
Looking b a c k ,  o n e  c a n n o t  h e l p  b u t  b e  s t r u c k '  by t h e  s e e m i n g l y  symbiotic 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x i s t i n g  b e t w e e n  t h e  s ta te ,  m i l i t a r y  p o w e r ,  a n d  t h e  p r i v a t e  
economy's ef f ic iency in the  age  of absolutism. Behind every  successful dynasty 
stood a n  a r ray  of opulent banking families. Access  t o  such bourgeois resources 
p r o v e d  c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  princes' state-building and centralizing policies. Princes 
also needed d i rec t  access t o  agricultural  resources,  which c o u l d  b e  mobi l i zed  
on ly  when  a g r i c u l t u r a l  productivity grew gcJ a n  e f fec t ive  administrat ive and 
m i l i t a r y  p o w e r  e x i s t e d  t o  e n f o r c e  t h e  p r i n c e s '  c l a i m s .  But  t h e  l i n e s  ,o f  
c a u s a t i o n  a l s o  r a n  in t h e  o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n .  Successful  state-building and . 
. . empire-building act iv i t ies  plus t h e  associated tendency toward concentration of - . 
u r b a n  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  offered ' t h e  private economy 
unique and invaluable o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  c a p t u r e  e c o n o m i e s  of s c a l e .  T h e s e  
e c o n o m i e s  of s c a l e  ..occasionally a f fec ted  industrial production but were  most . 
significant in t h e  development of t r ade  and f i n a n c e .  In a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  s h e e r  . . 
p r e s s u r e  of c e n t r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  taxation did as much as any other  economic. '  
f o r c e  t o  channel peasant production in to  t h e  marke t  and thereby augment the .  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  ' f o r  t r a d e  c r e a t i o n  a n d  economic specialization (de Vries 1976: 
242-243). 
Nor d o e s  t h e  "symbiot ic  relationshipt '  hold only for  ' t h e  period a f t e r .  1600. For t h e  
precocious .case of France,  Figure 1 shows t h e  i n c r e a s e  of r o y a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  a n d  
r e v e n u e s  f r o m  1 5 1 5  t o  1785. Al though  t h e  r a t e s  o f  g r o w t h  in b o t h  r e g a r d s  
. . 
acce le ra ted  appropriately a f t e r  1600, they also rose substantial ly during t h e  sixteenth 
. century.  After  1550, t h e  internal  Wars of Religion checked t h e  work of international 
expansion Francis I began ea r l i e r  in the  century,  but f r o m  t h e  1620s  o n w a r d  Louis  
XI11 and XIV (aided and abe t t ed ,  t o  be sure,  by Richelieu, Mazarin, Colbert  and other  
s ta temaking wizards) resumed the.  task with a v e n g e a n c e .  "As a lways , "  c o m m e n t s  
V.G. Kiernan, "war had every political ' recommendation and every  financial .  drawback" 
B o r r o w i n g ,  ' t h e n  p a y i n g  i n t e r e s t  on t h e  deb t ; .  a c c o u n t s  f o r  much of t h e  
discrepancy between t h e  two  curves. . G r e a t  capi ta l is ts  played crucia l  p a r t s  on b o t h  
s i d e s  of t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n :  as t h e  .principal sources of royal c red i t ,  especially in t h e  
' shor t  t e rm;  and as t h e  most important con t rac to rs  in '.the risky but lucrative . . business 
of collecting royal taxes.  
' I 
For th is  reason, i t  is worth noticing tha t :  
I F o r  p r a c t i c a l  p u r p o s e s  t h e  n a t i o n a l  d e b t  b e g a n  in t h e  r e i g n  of Francis I. 
Following t h e  loss of Milan, the  key t o  northern Italy, on September 15, 1522, 
~ Tilly, WARMAKINGISTATEMAKING: 13 
Francis  I borrowed .200,000 f rancs  . . ,. at 12.5 percent  f rom the  merchants  of 
. . Paris, t o  i n t e n s i f y  t h e  w a r  a g a i n s t  C h a r l e s  V. A d m i n i s t e r e d  by t h e  c i t y  
government,  this loan inaugurated t h e  fanious ser ies  of bonds based on revenues 
f r o m  t h e  capi ta l  and known as rentes.  sur 1'Hotel d e  Ville (Hamilton 1950: 246). 
(The government's fai lure t o  pay those  rentes, incidentally, helped aligned the  Parisian 
bourgedisie against  t h e  Crown during t h e  Frohde, s o m e  t w e l v e  d e c a d e s  l a t e r . )  By 
1595 ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l  d e b t  had r i s e n  t o  3 0 0  , .mill ion f r a n c s ;  d e s p i t e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  
bankruptcies, currency manipulations, a n d .  t h e  m o n u m e n t a l  r i s e  in t a x e s ,  b y  L o u i s  
XIV's d e a t h  in . 17 1 5  war-induced borrowing had i n f l a t e d  t h e  t o t a l  t o  about 3 billion 
. . 
f rancs ,  t h e  equivalent o f  about e ighteen years  in royal revenues ( ~ a m i l t o n  1950: 247, 
249). War, state apparatus,  taxation,  and  borrowing advanced in t ight  cadence.  . 
Although France was precocious, she was by no means alone. "Even more than  
in the, case of France," reports t h e  ever-useful Ear l  J. Hamilton: 
t h e  national debt  of England o r i g i n a t e d  a n d  h a s  g r o w n  dur ing  m a j o r  wars .  
~ x c ' e ~ t  for an-  insignificant carry-over f rom t h e  Stuar ts ,  t h e .  debt  began in 1689 
with t h e  reign of William and Mary. In t h e  words of Adam Smith, "it was in 
, t h e  war which began in 1688, and was concluded by t h e  t r ea ty  of Ryswick in 
1697, t h a t  t h e  foundation of t h e  present enormous deb t  of G r e a t  B r i t a i n  w a s  
f i r s t  laid" ( ~ a m i l t o n  1950: ,254). 
H a m i l t o n ,  i t  i s  t r u e , ,  g o e s  on t o  ' q u o t e  t h e  m e r c a n t i l i s t  C h a r l e s  Davenant ,  who 
complained in 1698 t h a t  t h e  high in teres t  r a t e s  promoted by g o v e r n m e n t  b o r r o w i n g  
w e r e  c r a m  ping English trade.  Davenant's complaint  suggests, however, t h a t  England 
was $lready enter ing Frederic Lane ' s  t h i r d  stage of  s t a t e - c a p i t a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  when  
merchants  and landowners ge t  more; of the  surplus than do t h e  suppliers of protection. 
U n t i l  t h e  s i x t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  t h e  Engl ish  e x p e c t e d  t h e i r  k ings  t o  l ive  on  
revenues-  f rom their  own property, and t o  levy t axes  only for war. G.R. ,Elton marks 
t h e  g rea t  innovation at Thomas Cromwell's draf t ing of Henry VIII's subsidy b i l l s  f o r  
' 
1534 and 1540: " . . . 1540 was ver.y careful  t o  contiriue t h e  rea l  innovation of 1534, 
namely t h a t  extraordinary contributions could be  levied f o r  reasons o t h e r  t h a n  w a r "  
(Elton 1975: 42). After tha t  point as before,  however, warmaking provided the  main 
st imulus t o  increases in the  level of taxation as well as of ' deb t .  ~ a r e l ~  d id  d e b t  
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a n d  t a x e s  r e c e d e .  w h a t  P e a c o c k  a n d  w i s e m a n  cal l  a "displacement effectl"(and 
o t h e r s  s o m e t i m e s  c a l l  a " r a t c h e t  e f f e c t " )  o c c u r r e d :  when  pub l ic  r e v e n u e s  a n d  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  r o s e  a b r u p t l y  dur ing war,  they se t  a new, higher floor beneath  which 
' ' peace t ime  revenues  a n d  e x p e n d i t u r e s  d i d  n o t  sink ( P e a c o c k  a n d  Wiseman  1961).  
D u r i n g  the N a p o l e o n i c  Wars ,  Br i t i sh  t axes  , r o s e  f rom 15 t o  24 per'cent of national 
income,.'a.nd t o  .almost th ree  t imes  t h e  ~ r e n c h  level of taxat ion   ath hi as 1975: 122). 
True, Britain had t h e  ' double advantage of relying less on expensive land fo rces  
than her continental  rivals and of drawing more  of her  t a x  r e v e n u e s  f r o m  c u s t o m s  
and excise  -- t axes  which were, despite evasion, significantly cheaper ,  t o  col lect  than 
land-, property-, and poll-taxes. Nevertheless, in England as well as elsewhere deb t  
and t axes  both rose enormously f rom the  seventeenth  century on. They rose mainly as 
a function of t h e  increasing cos t  of warmaking. 
What Do S t a t e s  Do? 
.As should now be c lea r ,  Lane's analysis of protection fails  t o  distinguish among 
several  d i f ferent .  uses of state-controlled v io lence .  Under  t h e  g e n e r a l  h e a d i n g  o f  
o r g a n i z e d  . v i o l e n c e ,  t h e  a g e n t s  of states character is t ica l ly  ca r ry  on four d i f ferent  
activit ies:  
1 .  . WARMAKING: e l i m i n a t i n g  o r  n e u t r a l i z i n g  t h e i r  own rivals outside t h e  
ter r i tor ies  in which they have c l e a r  and '  c o n t i n u o u s  . p r i o r i t y  as w i e l d e r s  of 
force;. 
2. S T A T E  MAKING: e l i m i n a t i n g  o r  - n e u t r a l i z i n g  t h e i r  r i v a l s  ins ide  t h o s e  
terri tories;  
3. PROTECTION: eliminating or  neutralizing t h e  enemies  of thei r  cl ients;  
4. EXTRACTION: a c q u i r i n g  t h e  m e a n s  of c a r r y i n g  o u t -  t h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  
' 
activit ies:  warmaking, statemaking,  and protection. 
The third i tem correspond; t o  protection a s  analyzed by Lane. But t h e  o ther  t h r e e  
a l s o  ' involve t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  force. .  They overlap 'inconipletely, and t o  varying 
d e g r e e s ;  f o r  exa ,mple ,  w a r m a k i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l  r i v a l s  o f  the .  . l o c a l  
b o u r g e o i s i e  delivers t o  t h a t  bourgeoisie. To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  a population 
divides i f i to ' enemy classes  and t h e  state extends  i t s  . f a v o r s  part ial ly to one class or  ' 
another ,  s ta temaking actual ly  . reduces  the  protection given some classes. 
Warmaking, s ta temaking,  p ro tec t ion ,  and  e x t r a c t i o n  e a c h  t a k e  a n u m b e r  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  f o r m s .  E x t r a c t i o n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  r a n g e s  f r o m  outr ight  plunder through 
regular t r i b u t e  t o  b u r e a u c r a t i z e d  t a x a t i o n .  Y e t  a l l  f o u r  d e p e n d  on  t h e  state's 
tendency t o  - monopolize t h e  concenira ted means of coercion. From t h e  perspectives 
of those  who . d o m i n a t e  t h e  state, e a c h  of t h e m  -- if c a r r i e d  . o n  e f f e c t i v e l y  -- 
g e n e r a l l y  r e i n f o r c e s  t h e  o t h e r s .  Thus  a state which .  s u c c e s s f u l l y  eradicates  its 
internal  rivals s t reng thens  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  e x t r a c t  r e s o u r c e s ,  t o  w a g e  w a r ,  and  t o  
' p r o t e c t  i t s  c h i e f  s u p p o r t e r s .  In the  earl ier  European experience,  broadly speaking, 
those  supporters  w e r e  t y p i c a l l y  l and lords ,  a r m e d  r e t a i n e r s  o f  t h e  m o n a r c h .  a n d  
churchmen. 
E a c h  of t h e  m a j o r  uses  of violence produced its own charac te r i s t i c  forms of 
organization. Warmaking yielded armies,  navies, and supporting services. Statemaking 
* 
p r o d u c e d  d u r a b l e  i n s t r u m e n t s  of s u r v e i l l a n c e  a n d  c o n t r o l  w i t h i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r y .  
Protect ion relied on t h e  or.ganization of warmaking and s ta temaking,  but added t o  it 
a n  apparatus  by which t h e  p ro tec ted  called for th  t h e  protection t h a t  was thei r  due -- 
notably through cour t s  a n d .  representa t ive .  assemblies. E x t r a c t i o n  b r o u g h t  t h e  f i s c a l  
a n d  a c c o u n t i n g  s t r u c t u r e s  into being. The organization and deployment of .violence 
itself accounts  for  much of the '  character is t ic  s t ruc tu re  of European states. 
T h e '  g e n e r a l  r u l e  s e e m s  t o  have  o p e r a t e d  l i k e  th is :  t h e  m o r e  c o s t l y  t h e  , 
activity,  a l l  o ther  things equal,  t h e  g rea te r  t h e  organizational residue. T o  t h e  ex ten t ,  
f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h a t  a g i v e n  g o v e r n m e n t  invested in large standing a rmies  -- a very 
costly, if ef fect ive ,  means of warmaking -- t h e  bureaucracy c r e a t e d  t o  s e r v i c e  t h e  
a r m y  w a s  l ike ly  t o  b e c o m e  bulky. Furthermore,  a government building a standing 
a rmy but c o n t r o l l i n g  a s m a l l  popu la t ion  w a s  l ike ly  t o  i n c u r  g r e a t e r  c o s t s ,  a n d  
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therefore  t o  buiild a bulkier s t ructure ,  than a government within a populous country. 
Brandenburg-Prussia was t h e  classic case  of high cos t  fo r  the available resources; t h e  
P r u s s i a n  e f f o r t  t o  build a n  a r m y  matching - t h o s e  of i t s  larger cont inenta l  -neighbors 
c rea ted  an  immense s t ructure ;  i t  mi l i t a r i zed  and  b u r e a u c r a t i z e d  m u c h  of  G e r m a n  
social  life. 
When it c o m e s  t o  e x t r a c t i o n ,  t h e  smaller  t h e  pool of resources and ' t h e  less 
commercia l ized t h e  economy,. o ther  things being equal,  t h e  more  difficult  t h e  work of 
ex t rac t ing  resources t o  sustain war and o ther  governmental  activit ies,  hence t h e  more 
extensive  t h e  fiscal  apparatus. England -i l lustrated t h e  corollary of t h a t  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  
with a relativ'ely large and commerc ia l i zed  pool of resources  drawn on by a relatively 
smal l  f iscal  apparatus.  As Gabriel  Ardant has argued, t h e  choice  of f i s c a l  s t r a t e g y  
probably made an  additional difference.  On t h e  whole, t axes  on land were  expensive 
t o  collect  a s  compared with taxes  on . t r a d e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  l a r g e  f l o w s  o f  t r a d e  p a s t  
. e a s i l y - c o n t r o l l e d  checkpoin t s :  Denmark's position as t r ide  t h e  en t rance  t o  the  Balt ic 
gave her a n  extraordinary opportunity t o  prof i t  f rom cus toms  revenues. 
With respect  t o  s ta temaking (in t h e  narrow sense of el iminating o r  neutralizing 
t h e  local  rivals of t h e  people who control led  t h e  s t a t e ) ,  a t e r r i t o r y  p o p u l a t e d  b y  
g r e a t  l a n d l o r d s  o r  by d i s t i n c t  religious g o u p s  generally imposed larger costs  on a 
c o n q u e r o r  t h a n  o n e  of f r a g m e n t e d  p o w e r  o r  h o m o g e n e o u s  c u l t u r e ;  t h i s  t i m e  
f ragmented  and homogeneous Sweden, with i t s  relat ively small  but e f fec t ive  apparatus  
of control ,  may i l lustrate t h e  .corollary. Finally, t h e  cos t  of protection (in t h e  sense 
of e l i m i n a t i n g  or  neutralizing t h e  enemies  of the.. s ta temakers '  cl ients)  mounted with 
t h e  r a n g e  o v e r  which t h a t  p r o t e c t i o n  e x t e n d e d ;  P o r t u g a l ' s  e f f o r t  t o  b a r  t h e  
M e d i t e r r a n e a n  . t o  i t s  merchants '  compet i tors  in t h e  spice .  t r ade  provides a textbook 
case of an  u n s u c c e s s f u l  p r o t e c t i o r i  e f f o r t  which  n o n e t h e l e s s  b u i l t  u p  a m a s s i v e  
s t r u c t u r e . '  Thus  t h e  s h e e r  s i z e  of t h e  government varied directly with the  e f fo r t  
devoted t o  e x t r a c t i o n ,  s t a t e m a k i n g ,  p r o t e c t i o n  a n d ,  espec. ia l ly ,  w a r  making ,  b u t  
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inversely with t h e  commercialization of t h e  economy .And t h e  ex ten t  of t h e  resource 
base. What is more,  t h e  re la t ive .  bulk of d i f fe ren t  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  government varied 
w i t h  t h e  c o s t - r e s o u r c e  rat ios of extract ion,  s ta temaking,  protection and warmaking. 
In Spain we see hypertrophy of Cour t  and  co 'u r t s  as t h e '  o u t c o m e  of  c e n t u r i e s  o f  
ef5or t  at subduing internal  enemies,  while in Holland we a r e  amazed  t o  see how small 
a fiscal  apparatus  grows up with high taxes  within a rich, cofnmercialized economy. 
C l e a r l y , '  w a r m a k i n g ,  e x t r a c t i o n ,  s t a t e m a k i n g ,  a n d  p r o t e c t i o n  w e r e .  
interdependent.  Speaking very, v e r y  g e n e r a l l y ,  t h e  c l a s s i c  ~ u r o p e a n  s t a t e m a k i n g  
exper ience followed this causal  pattern:  
WARMAKING--- EXTRACTION 
1 x 1 
PROTECTION -STATEMAKING ' 
In a n  i d e a l i z e d - ' s e q u e n c e , a  g r e a t  lo rd  . m a d e  w a r  s o  e f f e c t i v e l y  as t o  b e c o m e  
dominant in a substantial  terri tory.  But t h a t  warmaking led t o  increased extraction 
o f  t h e  means of war - men, arms,  food, lodging, transportation,  supplies, and/or t h e  
money t o  buy them -- f rom the  population within t h a t  ter r i tory .  The building up of 
warmaking capaci ty  likewise increased t h e  capaci ty  t o  ex t rac t .  The very activity of 
extract ion,  if successful ,  entailed t h e  elimination, neutralization,  or  cooptation of the  
g r e a t  lord's local  rivals; thus i t  led t o  s t a t e m a k i n g .  AS a by-produc t ,  i t  c r e a t e d  
organization in the  form of tax-collection agencies,  police forces,  courts,  exchequeurs, , 
account-keepers;  .thus i t  led t o  statemaking. To a l e s ~ e r  ex ten t ,  warmaking likewise 
caused s ta temaking through t h e  expansion of mili tary organization i tself ,  as a standing 
army,  war industries, supporting b u r e a u c r a c i e s  a n d  ( r a t h e r  l a t e r )  s c h o o l s  g r e w  up  
w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e  a p p a r a t u s .  All of t h e s e  s t r u c t u r e s  checked potent ia l  rivals and 
opponents. In the  course of making war, ex t rac t ing  resources ,  and  bui lding up t h e  
s t a t e  apparatus,  t h e .  managers of states formed all iances with specific social  classes. 
The members.. of those  c lasses  loaned resources, provided technical  services,  or helped 
a s s u r e  t h e  compl iance  of t h e  r e s t  of the  population, a l l  in return for a measure of 
. . 
pro tec t ion  against  t h e i r  o w n  r i v a l s  and  e n e m i e s .  As a r e s u l t  of t h e s e  m u l t i p l e  
s t ra teg ic  choices, a dist inctive . state . .apparatus grew up within e a c h  major section of . . 
Europe. 
T h i s  s i m p l i f i e d  mode l ,  however ,  negledts t h e  ex te rna l  relat ions which shaped 
every national s ta te .  Early in t h e  process, t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  " i n t e r n a l "  a n d  
' 'external" remained as unclear as the  distinction between state power and the  power 
accruing t o  lords allied with t h e  state. Later ,  t h r e e  interlocking influences connected 
a n y  g iven  n a t i o n a l  state t o  t h e  European network of states. First ,  t h e r e  were t h e  
flows of resources in t h e  fo rm of loans and supplies, e s p e c i a l l y  l o a n s  a n d  s u p p l i e s  
d e v o t e d  t o  w a r m a k i n g .  S e c o n d ,  t h e r e  w a s  t h e  c o m p e t i t i o n  a m o n g  s t a t e s  f o r  
hegemony in disputed ter r i tor ies ,  which st imulated warmaking and temporari ly erased 
t h e  dist inctions among warmaking, s ta temaking, .  and extract ion.  Third, the re  was the  
in te rmi t t en t  creat ion of coali t ions of s t a t e s  which temporari ly combined thei r  e f fo r t s  
t o  f o r c e  a g i v e n  s t a t e  i n t o  a c e r t a i n  f o r m  a n d  pos i t ion  within t h e  international 
network. The  warmaking coali t ion is one e x a m p l e ,  b u t  t h e  p e a c e m a k i n g  c o a l i t i o n  
played an even more crucia l  part: f rom 1648, if no t  before,  at t h e  ends of wars we 
find a l l  e f f e c t i v e .  European states 'coalescing temporari ly t o  bargain ou t  t h e  boundaries 
and rulers of t h e  recent..  belligerents. From t h a t  point on, the '  major reorganizations 
o f  t h e  European state system c a m e  in spurts,  at t h e  se t t l ements  of widespread wars. , 
. . 
From each large war, in general ,  emerged fewer  national states than had entered it. 
In these  circu I ns-tances, war became t h e  normal condition of t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
sys tem of states, and . the  normal means of defending or  enhancing a position within 
t h e  system.. Why war? No simple answer will do; w a r  'as  a p o t e n t  m e a n s  s e r v e d  
m o r e  t h a n  o n e  end .  B u t  s u r e l y  p a r t  of '  t h e  a n s w e r  g o e s  b a c k  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  
Tilly, \VARMAKING/STATEMAKING: 19 
. . 
. m e c h a n i s m s  of s t a t e m a k i n g :  t h e  v e r y  l o g i c  by which  a l o c a l  . l o r d  e x t e n d e d  o r  
defended t h e  per imeter  within which  h e  m o n o p o l i z e d  t h e  ' m e a n s  of v i o l e n c e ,  a n d  
thereby increased his r e t u r n .  from tribute,  continued on a larger sca le  into t h e  logic 
of war. Early in t h e  process, e x t e r n a l  and  i n t e r n a l  r i v a l s  o v e r 1 a p p e d : t o  a l a r g e  
d e g r e e .  Only t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of large pe r imete r s  of control  within which g rea t  
lords had checked thei r  r iva l s  s h a r p e n e d  t h e  l i n e  b e t w e e n  i n t e r n a l  a n d  . e x t e r n a l .  
George Modelski .sums up t h e  competi t ive logic cogently: 
Global power . . . strengthened those s t a t e s  t h a t  a t t a ined  it r e l a t i v e l y  t o  a l l  
o the r  political and other  organizations. What is more, o the r  states competing 
in t h e  global power game developed similar o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  f o r m s  a n d  s i m i l a r  
h a r d i n e s s :  t h e y  t o o  b e c a m e  nation-states -- in a defensive reaction,  because 
forced t o  t ake  issue with or  t o  confront a global power, as France confronted 
Spain and la ter  Britain, or in imitation of i t s  obvious success and effectiveness,  
a s  Germany followed t h e  example  o f  B r i t a i n  i n t o  W e l t m a c h t ,  o r  a s  e a r l i e r  
P e t e r  t h e  Grea t  had rebuilt Russia on Dutch p recep t s  and examples. Thus not 
only Portugal,  t h e  Netherlands, Britain and t h e  United S t a t e s  b e c a m e  n a t i o n -  
states, but  also Spain, France,  Germany, Russia and Japan.  The short ,  and t h e  
most parsimonious, answer t o  t h e  question of why these  succeeded where  'most 
. of t h e  European e f fo r t s  t o  build s t a t e s  failed' is t h a t  they were e i the r  global 
powers or successfully fought with or  against  t h e m  ( ~ o d e l s k i  1978: 231). 
Th i s  l o g i c  o f  in te rna t iona l  s ta temaking acts o u t  on a large  scale  the  logic of local  
aggrandizement.  The ex te rna l  complemented t h e  internal .  
If w e  a l l o w  t h a t  f r a g i l e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  " i n t e r n a l "  a n d  " e x t e r n a l "  
s ta temaking processes, then we might schemat ize  European s t a t e m a k i n g ' s  h i s t o r y  as 
t h r e e  stages:  1) t h e  di f ferent ia l  success of some powerholders in "external" struggles 
. establishes t h e  d i f f e r e n c e . b e t w e e n  a n  " i n t e r n a l "  a n d  a n  " e x t e r n a l "  a r e n a  f o r  . t h e  
d e p l o y m e n t  of f o r c e ;  2) "external" competi t ion genera tes  "internaln statemaking; 3) 
"external" compacts  among states influence t h e  fo rm and locus o f  p a r t i c u l a r  s t a t e s  , 
ever  more powerfully. In this- perspective, s ta te-cer t i f  ying organizations .such a s  t h e  
League of Nations and the. United Nations simply.exte.nded t h e  European-based process 
t o  t h e  w o r l d  a s  'a  whole ;  Whether  f o r c e d  o r  v o l u n t a r y ,  b loody o r  p e a c e f u l ,  
d e c o l o ~ i z a t i o n  simply completed t h a t  p r o c e s s  by w h i c h  e x i s t i n g  s t a t e s  l e a g u e d  t o  
c r e a t e  new ones. 
T h e .  e x t e n s i o n  of t h e  Europe-based  s t a t e m a k i n g  process t o .  t h e  res t  of t h e  
world, however, did not, c r e a t e  states in t h e  s t r i c t  European image. Broadly speaking, 
in ternal  struggles such as the  checking of g r e a t  regional lords and the  imposition of 
taxation on peasant villages produced important organizat ional  f e a t u r e s  o f  E u r o p e a n  
. . 
states: the  re la t ive  subordination of mili tary power t o  civil ian.  control, the ' ex tens ive  
bureaucracy of f iscal  surveillance, t h e  representation of wronged in teres ts  via petition . 
a n d  p a r  l i a m e n t  ; On t h e  whole ,  s t a t e s  elsewhere developed differently. The most 
telling f e a t u r e  of t h a t  d i f ference appears  in mili tary organization. E u r o p e a n  states 
b u i l t  up  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  a p p a r a t u s e s  t h r o u g h  s u s t a i n e d  struggles with the i r  subject  
populations, and by means of se lect ive  extension of p r o t e c t i o n  * t o  d i f f e r e n t  c l a s s e s  
w i t h i n  t h o s e  popula t ions .  T h e  a g r e e m e n t s  on p r o t e c t i o n  c o n s t r a i n e d  t h e  rulers 
themselves,  making them vulnerable t o  courts,  t o  assemblies, t o  withdrawals of credit ,  
services,  a i d  expertise. 
T o  a l a r g e r  d e g r e e ,  s t a t e s  t h a t  h a v e  c o m e  i n t o  be ing  r e c e n t l y  t h r o u g h  
decolonization o r  through r e a l l o c a t i o n s  of t e r r i t o r y  by t h e  d o m i n a n t  s t a t e s  h a v e  
acquired their  military organization f rom outside, without the  s a m e  internal  forging of 
mutual  constraints between r u l e r s  and  ru led .  T o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  o u t s i d e  states 
continue t o  supply military goods and exper t ise  in re turn-  for commodities,  o r  military 
al l iance,  or  both, t h e  new s t a t e s  harbor powerful, unconstrained o r g a n i z a t i o n s  which 
easily overshadow all  .other organizations within thei r  terri tories.  To the  e x t e n t  t h a t  
outside states guarantee  their  boundaries, t h e  managers of those  military organizations 
0 
exercise  extraordinary power within them. The advantages  of military power become 
enormous, t h e  incentives t o  se ize  power over t h e  state as a whole by means o f  t h a t  
a d v a n t a g e  v e r y  s t r o n g . .  - D e s p i t e  t h e  g r ' ea t  p l a c e  t h a t  warmaking occupied in t h e  
m a k i n g  of E u r o p e a n  s t a t e s ,  t h e  o ld  n a t i o n a l  s ta tes  o f  ~ ' u r o ~ e  a l m o s t  n e v e r  
experienced t h e  g rea t  disproportion between mili tary organization and all  o ther  forms 
of organization t h a t  seems t h e  fate of c l i e n t  s t a t e s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  c o n t e m p o r a r y  
,a 
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world. 
I n  o u r  own t i m e ,  n o t  a l l  states e n t e r i n g  t h e  Europe-based system of s t a t e s  
have been clients, and not a l l  have been equally vulnerable t o  military control. As a 
f i r s t  - a t t e m p t  t o  r e a s o n  f r o m  poss ib le  l e ssons  of t h e  E u r o p e a n  e x p e r i e n c e  t o  
. . 
a l t e rna t ive  paths through t h e  contemporary world, l e t  m e  propose a s i m p l e  f o u r f o l d  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .  As usual, t h e  four categor ies  result  f rom arbitrari ly cu t t ing  each of 
two continua in half; t h e  c o n t i n u a  a r e  a )  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which  a state's mi l i t a ry  
organization is c rea ted ,  trained,  and supplied by o ther  states:  internal  vs. external;  b) 
t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  resources  . to  s u p p o r t  m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  a r e  g e n e r a t e d  
d i r e c t l y  by t h e  e x p o r t  o f  l a b o r  o r  c o m m o d i t i e s  t o  other  countries: dependent vs. 
independent. 
DEPENDENCE ON EXPORTS, 
FOR MILITARY RESOURCES 
DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT 
SOURCE 
EXTERNAL cl ient  s t a t e s  e.g. clones e.g. 
O F  Honduras South Korea ' 
MILITARY 
INTERNAL merchants  e.g. 
ORGAN- Iraq 
IZATION 
,autonomous s t a t e s  
e.g. China, South 
Africa 
If we t ake  European exper ience seriously, we should e x p e c t  c l i e n t  states t o  f o l l o w  
s i g n a l s  f r o m  t h e i r  p a t r o n s ,  c l o n e s  t o  b e  e s p e c i a l l y  vu lnerab le  t o  military coups, 
merchants  t o  wax and wane a s  a func t ion .o f  the  world market  fo r  t h e i r  commodities 
o r  l a b o r ,  a n d  a u t o n o m o u s  s t a t e s  t o  occupy similar positions t o  t h e  old members of , 
t h e  European state-system. 
In t h e  light of European experience,  merchants  -- especially, in our own time, 
expor ters  of oil -- pose some especially interesting questions. The i r  s i t u a t i o n  m o s t  
r e s e m b l e s  t h a t  o f  Spa in  when r i c h e s  w e r e  flowing in from America. On the  one 
hand, when. demand for  thei r  expor t s  i s  high, t h e y  avo id  m u c h  of  t h e  s t a t e m a k i n g  
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e f f o r t ,  and t h e  consequent fighting o u t .  of agreements  with major classes within their  
own terri tories,  t h a t  so marked European  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  w a r .  T h a t  s i d e  of t h e  
e q u a t i o n  s u g g e s t s  t h e  poss ib i l i ty  of a n  . a c q u i e s c e n t  p o p u l a t i o n ,  a n d  a relatively 
. . 
peaceful  exercise  o f -  power by those who control  t h e  essential  commodities. On t h e  
o t h e r ,  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  acquire . .  a - f e a r s o m e  p o w e r  r e l a t i v e  t o  other  
organizations in thei r  vicinities. Where i t  is technically possible f o r  t h e  same small  
group t o  se ize  control  of t h e  mili tary apparatus  and t h e  sources of exports,  we should 
witness an  incentive to. mili tary coups which will outshadow t h e  pe t ty  m a n e u v e r s  of ' 
t h e  clones. Perhaps  only the  Shah's preference for  the  position of cl ient  to- t h a t  of 
'merchant saved Iran f rom being t h e  f i rs t  g r e a t  example.  
A Farewell  Warning 
on which 
Remember  how thin is t h e  tissue of evidence/all  th is  speculation lies. I have . 
schemat ized t h e  European experience of warmaking and s ta temaking,  w i t h o u t  t a k i n g  
a c c o u n t  of a l l  t h e  o ther  fac to rs  af fect ing.  variat ions in t h e  f a t e s  of national states: 
l a n g u a g e ,  r e l ig ion ,  geopo. l i t ica1 pos i t ion ,  access t o  t r a d e  r o u t e s .  Then  I h a v e  
h e e d l e s s l y  e x t e n d e d  t h e  s c h e m e  o u t s i d e  of E u r o p e ,  without any of the  historical 
qualifications and recalibrations i t  requires. Consider it history in t h e  As If, history 
a s  m a t e r i a l  f o r  theore t i ca l  reflection,  history as a source of hypotheses which must 
. re turn ,  for ref inement ,  rectif ication,  and verification, t o  t h e  a c t u a l  e x p e r i e n c e  f r o m  
which it came.  If summarizing European warmaking and s ta temaking is like skating 
on thin .ice, ext rapola t ing t h a t  summary t o  t h e  contemporary world resembles walking 
on water.  Send o u t  t h e  life-preservers! 
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NOTE. This is a rough-but-not-ready d r a f t  of a paper for a c o n f e r e k e  on S t a t e s  and 
Social Structures:  Research Implications of Current  Theories, sponsoied by t h e  Social 
S c i e n c e  R e s e a r c h  C o u n c i l .  and  he ld  in Mt. Kisco, New .York, 25-27 February 1982. 
More than usual, I would apprecia te  advice, not  t o  m e n t i o n  c a u t i o n  in q u o t i n g  t h e  
paper. ' I  a m  gra te fu l  t o  Dawn Hendricks for ass is tance with bibliography, and t o  t h e  
National Science Foundation for f inancial-  support. 
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